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The Kenosis of Unambiguous Sex in the Body of Christ: Intersex, Theology and Existing ‘for the Other’

1.1 Introducing Intersex
Intersex conditions, those where an individual’s genitalia appear ‘ambiguous’ or where the genital appearance does not ‘match’ the chromosomal configuration,​[1]​ raise a series of ethical and theological challenges for the Church. The theological concerns include ecclesiology (particularly in how the Church figures itself as the Body of Christ), and doctrines of healing, redemption, and the resurrection body. Ethical issues include the problems of non-disclosure and non-consent around genital surgeries, and the subsequent implications for the sexual pleasure and psychosomatic integrity of the individuals concerned. Questions surrounding intersex conditions have, however, been conspicuous by their absence in Church documents, including those on sexuality. In one sense this is right, for intersex conditions do not primarily affect sexuality, although some intersexed individuals do experience crises of gender identity and problems with sexual pleasure as a result of genital surgeries (see, for example, Arana et al 2005; Beck 2001; Chase 2003; Dreger 1999; Kessler 1998). 
Where intersex has been mentioned in Church documents, it has been in passing and almost always in the context of transsexualism; for example, in Some Issues in Human Sexuality (The Archbishops’ Council 2003: 221-249). However, such discussion has been either rather unreflective or else does not show evidence of a close engagement with the medical and social issues surrounding intersex. As with Oliver O’Donovan’s 1982 Grove booklet, Transsexualism and Christian Marriage, theological reflection on intersex usually rejects the notion that intersexed individuals’ morphologies might be simply variations rather than pathologies or biological evidence of a 'fall' in the created order. It tends to betray the somewhat heteronormative assumptions in which much mainstream theology is grounded.
In this paper I propose that intersex might be more usefully explored in light of theologies from impairment rather than (or as well as) those from sexuality. I consider some affinities between intersex conditions and disability, and how these areas of concurrence might feed into theologies which fully respect and take into account such states of bodily being. I argue that the hegemonies of 'goodness' and 'normality' which lead to the marginalization of intersexed and impaired bodies are grounded in theological beliefs which fail adequately to ‘queer’ oppressive socio-cultural discourses. Through the disability theology of John M. Hull I argue that the ‘ideologies of dominance’ which assume that the ‘sighted world’ is the only ‘real world’ are also evident in assumptions that the binary-sexed world is the only real world; and that it is appropriate for theologians to query and subvert such assumptions. I suggest that kenotic, self-giving behaviour in the realm of gender identity might involve the ceding of sexed signification by those who are not intersexed, rather than the assimilation or unchosen ‘correction’ of those who are.
1.2 Intersex, Disability, and Ideologies of Dominance in the ‘Real World’
If theologians have tended to think of intersex in terms of sexuality, some intersexed individuals have done the same. Intersexed people have sometimes made political alliances with lesbian and gay groups because of perceived shared aims such as subverting heterosexist mappings of ‘normal’ sexualities and gender identities onto ‘normal’ male-and-female bodies. Moreover, those individuals who have experienced exclusion or marginalization because of the stigma attached to having unusual anatomy or to having undergone several surgeries might find an affinity with those who have been excluded because of their sexuality or expression of gender. However, Emi Koyama of activism group Intersex Initiative has argued (Koyama 2006) that the advantages of allying intersex interests with those of LGBT or queer-identified groups are limited, and suggests rather that those intersexed/DSD​[2]​ individuals who do not consider themselves transgendered have more to gain from approaching intersex issues from the perspective of the radical disability rights movement. 
Koyama’s links between intersex and impairment are important ones. Intersex conditions are not perceived as universally terrible by intersexed (or other) individuals; some of those intersexed people who were made to undergo surgery in childhood or adolescence had not felt that there was anything abnormal or pathological about their bodies until that time. Likewise, some people who are perceived as disabled may not view themselves as such; deafness is commonly viewed as a disability by society at large but not by all deaf people. Disability rights activists often advocate viewing disability not as a particular curse or a particular blessing – both of which have happened in the Christian tradition, whereby disability has been figured as punishment for sin or forming-ground for patience, forbearance and humility – but as simply another kind of ordinary, unremarkable life. 
Part of the Church’s unwillingness to treat impairment and intersex as variations rather than unproblematically as pathologies has stemmed from its investment in certain naturalized hegemonies as accurately reflecting the ‘real world’. However, this is challenged from the perspective of impairment by John M. Hull.  Hull argues that human worlds are plural because the bodies in which they are experienced are plural, but that able people are largely unwilling or unable to accept that their world is not the only possible world; not ‘just the way things are’. He says, ‘The normal world regards the disabled person as banished, excluded, deprived, as it were, of citizenship rights, and as therefore to be pitied and helped’ (Hull 2003: 24). The blind world, for example, is very different but no less real. Until sighted people realize this, the blind will never be truly valued and accepted because of the hegemony of the ‘sighted world’ which is seen (literally) as the norm (Hull 2003: 30). Hull argues that this unwillingness goes hand-in-hand with dichotomous discourses of sex, race and so on – for ‘uniformity goes with centrality, with authority, and with power’ (Hull 2003: 30). These are characteristics which are appealing in a mindset which wishes to demarcate, assimilate and (ostensibly or not) homogenize. Hull says, 

[The] unconscious hegemony of the sighted is an instance of an ideology of dominance, and it must be questioned, if Christian faith is to be genuinely open to all sorts and conditions of people (Hull 2003: 31). 

Hull’s appeal to theology as potentially subversive or resistant to such ideologies of dominance can, I propose, apply to theologies of intersex and transsexualism too. For the ‘normally’-sexed male-and-female to truly take account of these different bodies, it will be necessary to move to an understanding that the dichotomously-sexed world is not the ‘only’ or ‘real’ world – which will aid the honouring of ‘the distinctiveness of the experience of those who permanently reside in various states’ (Hull 2003: 35). Nancy Eiesland, author of The Disabled God: Toward a Liberatory Theology of Disability, is among those who argue that impairment (a specific physical condition) only becomes disability when society is not set up for it: in this reading, wheelchair use is only a disadvantage in a world of stairs, narrow corridors and tight doorways. Similarly, it can be argued, the perceived non-possession of an unambiguously-sexed body is only a disadvantage in a society where binary, male-or-female sex is a perceived good. Crucially, as Hull says, 

Once the hegemony of the single world in the relation between able and disabled people is broken, a challenge is mounted against all other human worlds that claim to be absolute (Hull 2003: 26).

This will, necessarily, include the world which is self-evidently male-and-female. Just as Hull argues that the ‘sightedness’ of the Bible is not a permanent or particularly important aspect of it, but rather ‘just the way that it was unconsciously adapted by the sighted people who wrote it’ (Hull 2003: 67), so, I contend, the dually-sexed grid placed onto the world is a provisional overlay by the non-intersexed majority, who are themselves influenced by patterns and discourses deeply naturalized in the culture. A disruption of such assumptions is crucial, however, because they become directive as well as descriptive, and lead to the devaluation and elision of unusual bodies and identities. Acknowledging the plurality of human worlds provides a way in to figuring disability as something other than deficiency or lack; impairment is not simply exclusion from the ‘big world’ (Hull 2003: 21-2). Exposing the penultimacy of dichotomous sex is necessary not only to include intersexed people and those with disabilities but also to expand and diversify imagery to the advantage of everyone else (Hull 2003: 22). Impaired and unusually-sexed bodies are part of the Body of Christ and if they suffer further marginalization and conceptual erasure, the rest of the Body suffers too (as in 1 Corinthians 12.26) by perpetuating a false image of its own constitution. 
1.3 The Problem of Kenosis in Self-Signification
The body imagery in 1 Corinthians 12 is compelling by virtue of its emphasis on mutuality (although this has sometimes been undermined by concretized notions of what constitutes weakness, dishonour or inferiority), whereby body parts only make sense in relation to one another. This chimes with Edith Wyschogrod’s work in Saints and Postmodernism on hagiography and narrative, whereby saints’ bodies can be given into a multiplicity of stories and thereby come to signify multiply too. Wyschogrod suggests that saints themselves become ‘texts’ because their bodies become inscribed by meanings given them by their biographers and those exposed to (and who come to have faith in) their stories. However, she adds, although texts about saints are context-specific, they can also ‘impinge on what is integral to time-bound social and political praxes and, in fact, may serve to undermine them’ (Wyschogrod 1990: 5). Saints (usually) had historically-located, flesh-and-blood bodies and existences before they had hagiographic biographies, but the crux of the meaning of hagiographic literature exists in the overlaps or joins between its various chronological layers: the time of the event, the time of the writing-down of the event, and the time of the hearing of the writing-down of the event (Wyschogrod 1990: 6). Different ‘voices’, heteroglossia, clamour to be heard, not only as a result of the chronology but also of the contemporaneous dissonance between, for instance, the claims of the saint and of his/her institutional or authoritative context – often shifting in predominance at different points in the narrative. 
Where embodied lives are read as exemplary – as in hagiography – this may be seen to ‘fix’ the ‘meaning’ of a body somewhere outside or beyond itself: thus, arguably, eroding its subjectivity. The giving-over of bodies to be figured and described by others has sometimes clashed with the desire of intersexed people and others to direct their own bodies, to pull back the power to self-describe which has been erased through narratives of excision. There is thus always a tension between bodies in and of themselves and bodies as constructed communally. In fact, it is conceivable that trying to find a single, synthesized reading (trying to find the ‘original’ of a word or a body) might actually detract from the polyphony of truths about bodies which appear where readings jostle for pre-eminence.
Just as particular individuals can be set apart as exemplary in terms of sanctification, so particular individuals can literally come to embody a community’s understanding of its own bodiliness. The ‘good’ of this is ambiguous, for whilst the Church, for example, has often paralleled its own felt weakness or lack with real bodies such as those of people who are blind or deaf, in doing so it has normalized the perception of blindness or deafness as weakness or lack – which Hull warns against (Hull 2003: 22). Similarly, whilst there is potential in noting a possible disruption of heterosexual, homosocial norms in unusually gendered or unusually sexed bodies – in making intersexed people’s bodies prophetic harbingers of a new order, Galatians 3:28 come true, for instance – there is also a risk therein of objectification and misuse. Just as saints have often come to be given import beyond – or different from – that incited in their lifetimes, so intersexed and other individuals have sometimes been made to bear the weight of unsought connotation: from the mythic associations afforded the androgyne throughout history, through having the ‘falseness’ of their bodies changed to a ‘true sex’ via surgery, or even through being figured as a ‘third’ or politically significant liminal figure by activists when all they want is a quiet, unremarkable life (Preves 2003: 39). Making a person ‘mean’ concepts with which they may not wish to be associated – as when an intersexed individual is held up as ‘necessarily’ queering heterosexual gender-mapping even if they themselves would not wish to be aligned with such a project – risks distorting and misrepresenting them. This might be interpreted as doing violence to their personhood. 
Interestingly, however, for Wyschogrod, the saints’ self-giving in their bodies can also be read as a kenosis of self-signification (Wyschogrod 1990: 33) as well as more concrete self-determination. Wyschogrod’s saints give up their bodies to be used by and for others, but, concomitantly, this means that their bodies also come to be figured (or linked to something signified) by others. Wyschogrod says, 

“The saint forgoes self-interest claims, or, in Christian hagiographic language, the soul empties self of self. For theistic hagiography, the ‘interior space’ that is thus hollowed is filled by a transcendent Other. But human others, the recipients of saintly benevolence, may also come to occupy this void” (Wyschogrod 1990: 33). 

Daphne Hampson has written on the problems surrounding exhortations of kenosis for groups who are all too used to being submissive and downtrodden (see Hampson 1990: 155; 1996a: 129-30). The last thing intersexed people need, Hampson might say, is even more ceding of their continence as subject-selves; kenosis might be a suitable project for the privileged, but for those who are already conceptually threatened it risks becoming a theologically-sanctioned form of masochism. Hampson (1990: 155; 1996a: 129-30) writes in response to Ruether 1983: 115-6, and says that the paradigm of the ideal self being sacrificial and broken for others too easily feeds into a downtrodden 'martyr-complex' already present in some women (Hampson 1996a: 130) and is therefore not an appropriate ideal for the disenfranchised. Conversely, what is virtuous for the powerless is the courage to claim power (Hampson 1996a: 131). Sarah Coakley has countered that the kenosis critiqued by Hampson is not identical with the kenosis described by Paul (Coakley 2002: 9), and that the latter can be an important element of holding vulnerability and personal empowerment together, 'precisely by creating the "space" in which non-coercive divine power manifests itself' (Coakley 2002: 5). Coakley reasonably suspects that Hampson is too essentialist in her demarcations of all males as powerful and all females as powerless (Coakley 2002: 22), that Hampson too unproblematically considers power a 'good' (Coakley 2002: 32), and that Foucault’s comment that all of us wields power in some respect might also disrupt Hampson’s claim (Coakley 2002: 34). Some of these discussions are expanded by Hampson, Coakley and others in Hampson 1996b. 
Coakley's criticisms of Hampson are important, but do not entirely negate Hampson’s wariness of kenosis: Coakley owns that the goods of ‘personal empowerment, prophetic resistance, courage in the face of oppression, and the destruction of false idolatry’ (Coakley 2002: 38) have not yet been realized; that Christians stand in a ‘hiatus of expectant waiting’ (Coakley 2002: 39) which Hampson and other post-Christian writers cannot countenance. Coakley rationalizes that such a time of waiting and ‘not-yet-ness’ is itself ‘transformative and empowering’ (Coakley 2002: 39). However, I would counter that ethical praxis demands proactivity and a refusal to believe that a just world is not possible and realizable in this present realm. Waiting for the transformation of the unjust structures of society to come from elsewhere, or after the jump of future-eschatology, risks repeating exactly the passivity of which Hampson argues that ‘women’ (and, we might say, other disenfranchised persons) have been guilty. 
How, then, can the tightrope of the ambiguity of kenosis be trodden in theologies from intersex? Iain Morland, in his work on the ethics surrounding the narration of intersex, argues that ethically ‘good’ identities should promote the recognition of other identities. This includes sexed identities (Morland 2005: 129). The ‘character’ of any body rests both on its conscious self-projection and on its reaction from, and constitution by, others. One’s social body is one’s community too, and one changes this broader ‘body’ by virtue of one’s individual somatic body existing within it. Formidably, then, it may be that it is those whose bodies are considered unremarkable in terms of a sex-gender harmony who must be prepared to relinquish the (unsolicited) power and status which currently comes with such a state of affairs. This, I contend, might be what is meant by giving more honour to ‘weaker members’ as in 1 Corinthians 12: if one member is felt to be less ‘characteristic’ of the body than another, if one member lacks what is felt to be a particular (arbitrary) good, it might be said that what matters is to bring that member into line with everyone else, to somehow give them what it is that they lack. However, the implication drawn from Morland’s point might be that, in the Body of Christ, rather than making the weaker (or less honoured) members conform to the Body, conversely, the Body conforms to them. If it is considered ‘weak’ to lack a particular sexed status, then, rather than making those who lack binary sexed status the exception and compensating for them on these grounds, why not make it that everyone else cedes the ‘honour’ attached to unambiguously-sexed status? Just as embracing disabled bodies entails a conceptual shift so that ‘healing’ need not mean ‘becoming able-bodied’, so embracing the ‘weaker’ or less honoured members of the sexual body might mean ceding perceived ‘goods’ such as unambiguous sex. As F. Gerald Downing comments, the ‘weak’ elsewhere in Paul’s writings are those bound to convention, as with the controversies over meat-eating in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10 and Romans 14 (Downing 2005: 181). It might be argued that the extent to which binary sex-gender categories are used to demarcate humans in our society is no more than a deep-rooted convention, and one which must not be held in greater regard than the demands of justice. Morland goes so far as to say,

The sex identities “male” and “female” are indefensible because they do not endorse the recognition of sexual diversity. Quite the opposite: such binary sex identities constitute a commitment to a system that erases intersexuality… Non-intersexed people who seek justice for the intersexed should refuse the identities “male” or “female” (Morland 2005: 129, 131).

It might be that it is the non-intersexed who are called to cede their binary identity, to engage in this particular kind of kenosis, rather than those considered weak or marginal in their sexed or gendered identity who are ‘saved’ by assimilation into expected categories. The relinquishing of sexed identities, even those held dear, could be a more constructive, enriching and humanizing part of that ethical action which is done for the ‘other’ by the non-intersexed saints. This could entail a handing-over of identification to those beyond the narrative categories within binary sex signification, and thereby speak of a solidarity, a ‘standing with’ those who cannot be represented adequately within existing systems. 
To assume that it is always and inevitably those with atypical patterns of sex, gender or bodiliness whose configurations are problematic is to further exclude them from signification. Moreover, to cling to a particular model of human gender because it is thought to be central to human status as being in the image of God is not only unhelpful – as Morland implies – but also idolatrous. For humans to cling solely to what they already believe to be true of God can only limit a fuller understanding of what it is actually possible to know of God. Only accepting as veritable what is already indubitable means some epistemological sites will be deemed irrelevant, or too dark for the light of God to reach. The ‘kenotic hymn’ of Philippians 2.5-11 counsels that humans are to emulate Jesus, who did not consider equality with God something to be grasped; but to exploit, to cling, or to grasp at equality with God is exactly what is happening when humans decide that a single present or historical reading of gender tells the whole story of God. To claim God as a figurehead for a particular human project – to purport to know exactly what the ‘perfected’ Body of Christ will look like, and which identities can and cannot exist legitimately within its prototype – is to attempt to stand beyond contradiction. 
1.4 Goods versus Goods: Ethical Questions and the Consequences of Surgery
Part of this model of kenosis is also ceding the privilege attached to accord with the status quo. Assumptions that doctors always know best or that particular surgical norms are ethically legitimate because they also support a theological ‘good’ such as gender complementarity are questionable at best. Recognizing the legitimacy and goodness of atypical or ‘problematic’ bodies is a part of the process of allowing those who live in them to self-identify and self-direct – empowering them as actors and authors of their own subjectivity. Theology must examine the ways in which it has been complicit with a heteronormative project which has sanctioned early surgery for intersex and has thereby hurt those whose bodies or identities were not deemed legitimate as they were.​[3]​ Just as people with disabilities are often treated as incapable of self-direction and autonomous decision-making, so intersexed individuals (and the parents of intersexed infants) are sometimes disempowered in terms of consent to surgery and other treatment. 
From the 1960s until the early 1990s ‘corrective’ surgery on intersexed children, at least in Britain and North America, almost universally took place as early as possible, starting in infancy. Most children were assigned girls, as it was harder to build a penis than hollow out a vagina (Preves 2003: 55). Those with large clitorises typically had them cut back or removed altogether. Any child whose genitals at birth did not fit the measurements agreed by the medical profession (under 0.9cm for a clitoris, over 2.4cm for a [stretched] penis) (Preves 2003: 55) was likely to be adjusted – without their consent, but also often without that of their parents. This erasure of difference raises its own problems, which I will not discuss in detail here. However, more immediately pressing are the ongoing consequences faced by those who have undergone corrective surgery. Although many intersexed people are happy to have had surgery, others have spoken out against their treatment. Some feel the gender they were assigned as infants does not fit with what they now know of themselves. Others resent the fact that their capacity for orgasm or for any kind of pleasurable sexual activity has been removed for the sake of making their genitals look less unusual (Morris 2004: 26), or to allow (for example) vaginal penetration at the expense of enjoyment (Kessler 1998: 56). Perhaps most problematically, such surgery almost invariably took place without the patients’ consent, either because they were very young at the time or because (in later or repeat operations as older children and adolescents) they had simply not been asked:

They didn’t mention the part where they were going to slice off my clitoris. All of it. I guess the doctors assumed I was as horrified by my outsized clit as they were, and there was no need to discuss it with me (Moreno 1999: 138).

At the age of 13, I was scheduled for surgery. I was not allowed to accept myself; I was told what is normal and how I should be. I was never told that I was viable; or that who I was is all I had to be… My body was altered to meet social values, but my values were never discussed. My puberty was focused on vaginal function before I had a chance to care (Morris 2004: 25).

Some doctors have countered that it would be at least as harmful psychologically not to carry out corrective surgery as to carry it out – though follow-up reports on people whose genitals were left uncorrected suggests that this is not necessarily the case (Kessler 1998: 97; Diamond and Sigmundson 1997). In cases of intersex, any harm-of-non-intervention will almost invariably be a social or psychological harm rather than a strictly physiological one; this does not render it any less significant, but it does demonstrate that doctors are always already taking on the bolstering of broader goods than simply physical ones. They are part of reflecting and reproducing social norms about what constitutes correct or appropriate bodiliness. Ethically, then, what is at stake in assessing the legitimacy of early versus late (or no) elective surgical intervention is the awkward question of which goods ‘trump’ other goods, and which goods deserve to be sacrificed or compromised. The ethical problems attached to performing irreversible surgery in sexually sensitive areas without the fully informed consent of the patient are obviously manifold; the ethical problems attached to not doing this surgery must also not be downplayed, but the point is that whilst surgery left undone can always be done (at least in the eight or nine years between infancy and early puberty, after which therapy for some conditions may become more complex because of hormonal changes), surgery once done cannot be undone. 
1.5 Making the Hermaphrodite Fuckable: Heteronormativity as Hegemony
Kiira Triea, who underwent vaginoplasty at the age of 14, says, 

Part of my left upper arm was pressed into genital duty here, which bothered me greatly when I came out of surgery. I wish I’d been consulted or at least informed. Of course, why would I need to be informed? The objective was to make the hermaphrodite fuckable (Triea 1999: 143).

Definitions of impairment may vary from culture to culture, and impairments may become disabilities if a given society is not set up for them. The same goes for configurations of physical sex. As Triea’s experience implies, in large part, what is considered problematic about intersexed external genitalia in particular is the fact that they cannot always be used ‘normally’ in heterosexual penetrative sexual intercourse. Within surgical paradigms, it is often deemed ‘necessary’ that the eventual penis and vagina are capable of penetrating and being penetrated respectively. Much interventive surgery is done to promote this end, with vaginas being widened and lengthened. Reproductive capacity has been deemed rather unimportant, as has been the ability to feel sexual pleasure. Sexual intercourse is seen basically as social ritual. An AIS​[4]​ girl, for instance, must ostensibly behave as would a ‘normal’ fertile XX woman, even though she is not one. Sexual intercourse still has heterosexual meanings attached to it: vaginoplasty to allow penetration was, until recently, only offered to women who were engaged to be married, and, conversely, the notion that an oversized clitoris could promote (non-penetrative) pleasure rather than having to be excised was judged somewhat seditious. Questioning assumptions around the ‘necessity’ of being able to engage in penetrative sex means questioning heteronormative assumptions which run more insidiously through theology. It also means continuing to take seriously the work of those theologians who have begun to ‘queer’ binary, heteronormative religious, political, social and economic constructs (such as Marcella Althaus-Reid, Thomas Bohache, Martín Hugo Córdova Quero, Deryn Guest, Robert Goss, Elizabeth Stuart and Mona West).
	This is crucial, for the hegemony of the ‘real world’ as described by Hull, and which I have argued is also the hegemony of a binary-sexed world in spite of the many bodies and identities which do not fit into it, has fed into theological assumptions about goodness and normality too. Bolstering heteronormativity has sometimes taken precedence over championing the needs and concerns of the marginal. Promoting the welfare of those who are marginalized for any reason is sometimes seen by churches as an optional extra, ethically supererogatory to the ‘real business’ of saving souls. Inclusion of people with disabilities, and other excluded groups, is sometimes considered ‘kindness’ rather than justice. This may stem from a failure to see people with disabilities or other ‘differences’ (intersex conditions, homosexual orientations and so on) as ‘really’ the Church. Alternatively, it may be have more to do with beliefs about the centrality of some strands of Scripture and tradition over others: the equation of sickness with curse (from passages such as Exodus 15.26), or – conversely – restored health as reward for obedience (Hosea 6.1); an overweening focus on the boundaries between salvation and damnation, pure and impure, ‘in’ and ‘out’. As Nancy Eiesland comments, however,

A liberatory theology of disability is a theology of coalition and struggle in which we identify our unique experiences while also struggling for recognition, inclusion, and acceptance from one another and from the able-bodied society and church (Eiesland 1994: 29). 

These issues have far wider implications; they are not just ‘minority interests’. The questions of exclusion and perfection of bodies surrounding disability and intersex have enormous repercussions for the whole of theology. Eiesland criticizes the manner in which ‘people with disabilities have been encouraged to see our needs as unique and extraordinary, rather than as society-wide issues of inclusion and exclusion’ (Eiesland 1994: 28). 
This is significant, for the tyranny outlawing intersexed bodies is just as oppressive for any other body which does not live up to the contemporaneous custom. Recognition of the inherent worth of every body is the aspiration of a just righteousness to be realized in this present life. Part of the eschatological nature of envisaging a just world is the tension of the visionary foretaste, the ‘already’ of the new creation, the behaving as if this just world already exists: otherwise the false barriers to freedom erected by the bogus powers will seem too insurmountable. Statistically, intersexed people are in a minority, but intersex must be more than a minority issue for theology, since an appreciation of the complexity and diversity of human embodiment, biology and sex identity has implications for male-and-female heterosexual norms which are deeply naturalized across theological discourse. If some people do not fit the conceptual category male-and-female, this disrupts the entire taxonomy, since male-and-female purports to be all-encompassing. Intersex disturbs all human sex, and fear of the intersexed body seems actually to be about fear of the body in general. If we do not talk about bodies as they really are, including bodies in their variation and transgression from demarcation as male or female, then we are not really talking about bodies at all.
1.6 Healing, Redemption and the Resurrection of the Body
The redemption of human bodies entails appreciation of their status as held in God, not just in human signification. To suppose that perfection or even redemption necessarily entails a major change from the current physical state more for those who are impaired or atypical than for those who are not (assuming that in the resurrection body impairments which currently cause physical pain will no longer do so) risks negating the particularity of the body as it currently is, and, suggests David Pailin, God’s love for the body as it currently is:

The suggestion that in a post-mortem existence those who are handicapped in this life will exist in a state that is freed from such limitations… threatens, if it does not actually deny, the divine love for the actual individual, however handicapped that person may be. The divine care for each individual is the affirmation of each person as that person. It does not “unself” the actual individual by loving her or him for what she or he might be or eventually will be… Whatever transformations may occur as a person… moves into a different mode of existence, it is essentially that person as he or she is at the present moment, and not a different one or a potential one, who is embraced in the divine (Pailin 1992: 164).

Tim Gorringe responds to Pailin,

This insistence seems… to overlook the role that dream, vision and hope plays in our “gestalt”, that “me-ness” which will be raised, and which is not simply identical with our physical or moral selves (Gorringe 2001: 51). 

Although Gorringe is right to say that the resurrection body will, indeed, not be exactly like the present body, the point is that we do not know exactly how it will be unlike it. Gorringe concludes that in the transfiguration and renewal of the whole creation ‘there will be neither impairment nor handicap but, as the Athanasian creed put it, “one equal glory”’ (Gorringe 2001: 52). However, an assumption that an equality of glory could not embrace differences in bodies which would include certain impairments seems to me a dangerous one. Just as even impaired bodies are not currently globally incapacitated, as Wendell notes,​[5]​ so in the new creation characteristics or configurations which are currently disabling may no longer be so. This also applies to genital configurations. The eschatological ‘healing’ of impaired and intersexed bodies in particular, then, does not necessarily entail ‘restoration’ to what might be considered more normal or desirable by human standards. A belief that bodies will be ‘fixed’ after death sometimes makes it too easy to dismiss the struggles faced currently, but an attitude that human beings might be co-redeemers with Christ encourages endeavouring to do everything possible to eradicate enforced discommodity and promote inclusion. 
1.7 Temporarily Able, Temporarily Sexed: Meeting God in Unexpected Bodies
Nancy Eiesland’s work on the ‘disabled God’ emphasizes that Christ himself is portrayed in the New Testament as having a wounded body even after his resurrection (Eiesland 1994: 99-100). It is conceivable that other instances of physical impairment, and physical atypicality, will also persist in the human bodies of the general resurrection. If God has come to inhabit this, Jesus’ unexpected, non-dominant body, the way is opened for other unexpected, non-dominant bodies to reflect and live God too. The resurrected Jesus, with his impaired hands and feet, is God’s revelation of a new humanity – ‘underscoring the reality that full personhood is fully compatible with the experience of disability’ (Eiesland 1994: 100). The impaired Jesus’ wounds are not to be vilified, nor to be pitied; they are marks of life experience, and signposts to a new kind of life too. This imagery of God as disabled sets up a disjunction with the complete, powerful, independent God as espoused in the traditional philosophical perfections. It is not therefore possible to suppose that God’s perfection and wholeness is like human perfection and wholeness (or what humans consider to be perfection and wholeness) but ‘more so’. God’s ability, God’s ableness, is not human ableness writ large. It is in God’s limitedness as human that we encounter God, in the specific and limited body of Jesus. It is in and through other specific, limited bodies that we go on encountering God. 
It has been suggested by Frances Young and others that the able-bodied fear the disabled not because disability is so far away from the ‘good’ body but because it is so close (Young 1990: 170). People with disabilities are not, in fact, so unlike ‘normal’ people, and so serve as reminders of what the able body could easily become. As such, the able are forced to face the possibility that they themselves could become the disabled; that they are, in fact, only ‘temporarily able’. If the able are in fact only temporarily able – able according to the current standards of a given society, although their faculties may well change later – then the unambiguously ‘sexed’, as male or female, are in fact only temporarily sexed. There are those of us whose bodies match the current criteria for accepted maleness or femaleness, but this does not necessarily mean that this will be so forever. Perhaps intersexed bodies threaten non-intersexed people because, as historian and activist for intersex issues Alice Dreger says, ‘The questioned body forces us to ask exactly what it is – if anything – that makes the rest of us unquestionable’ (Dreger 1998: 6). This includes societal attitudes toward care and interrelation as well as toward physiologies. The structures which have oppressed and excluded impaired and intersexed bodies are not unique, although impaired and intersexed people might have experienced and interpreted them uniquely because of their own particular social and historical circumstances. Importantly, as noted by Koyama (2006) and Dreger (2004), the types of medical paternalism criticized by intersex activists and by some people with disabilities are not limited to these particular conditions or situations. However, argues Eiesland, ‘People with disabilities have been encouraged to see our needs as unique and extraordinary, rather than as society-wide issues of inclusion and exclusion’ (Eiesland 1994: 28). This kind of attitude has led to the further alienation and ‘othering’ of people with disabilities from the rest of society. In fact, however, the limiting attitudes which objectify and alienate people with disabilities and those with intersex conditions, are the same as those which alienate humans from one another and from the rest of creation more broadly. 
1.8 Conclusions: Querying Privilege, Privileging Otherness
If physical ability and unambiguous sex both bring a certain privileged status, this in itself should provoke questions about their place, and the extent to which they should be sought, in the new and coming Kingdom where status and privilege are overturned. Since the new creation is already beginning, this means it is necessary to consider the extent to which both ambiguous sex and physical impairment are rendered more difficult specifically because of societal treatment of them. Healing is not simply about individuals, but about communities – overcoming fears about a subsuming of identity which then provoke a desperate clinging to arbitrary categories. It is this which leads to an unwillingness to accept those who are ‘other’ – the impaired, the intersexed, the liminal – perhaps out of a fear that to speak with someone necessitates losing one’s own voice. 
Theologies which are theologies only of the privileged and those considered (overtly or otherwise) ‘decent’ or legitimate cannot tell the whole tale of how humans have related and continue to relate to God. To fail to engage with other stories and testimonies is to fail to engage with the stories and testimonies of a significant segment of our human community. Likewise, to repeat, disseminate and legitimate only the theological stories of those who have found a heterosexual binary model of sex and gender adequately represents them is to construct a theology made solely in our own image, rather than also in that of a God who is multiple, discomfiting and pluriform. The Body of Christ is intersexed and impaired, because its members (or constituents) include intersexed and impaired bodies. Intersex, like disability, is therefore a legitimate conceptual ‘place’ from which to think theologically. Appropriate kenotic behaviour for those with bodies not deemed unusual or marginal may be to cede their legitimacy, to give up the status that comes from a bodily sex deemed normal or clear. Intersex is at once marginal and non-marginal, and deserves theological reflection exactly because it is both marginal and non-marginal. Where people are marginalized, excluded or swept aside, this is exactly where theological-ethical praxis demands that a just theology should speak with and have solidarity with them. Kenosis for non-intersexed people necessitates thinking ourselves into the margins – not in order to colonize experience which is not ours, but because intersex disturbs binary constructs of sex and gender in their entirety. 













Alderson, Julie, Anna Madill and Adam Balen 2004 ‘Fear of Devaluation: Understanding the Experience of Intersexed Women with Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome’, in British Journal of Health Psychology 9: 81-100

Arana, Marcus de María et al 2005 ‘A Human Rights Investigation into the Medical ‘Normalization’ of Intersex People: A Report of a Public Hearing by the Human Rights Commission of the City and County of San Francisco’ online at http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/sfhumanrights/Committee_ Meetings/Lesbian_Gay_Bisexual_Transgender/SFHRC%20Intersex%20Report(1).pdf (accessed 10/7/2007)

The Archbishops’ Council 2003 Some Issues in Human Sexuality, A Guide to the Debate: A Discussion Document from the House of Bishops’ Group on Issues in Human Sexuality (London: Church House Publishing)

Beck, Max 2001 ‘My Life as an Intersexual’, Nova online at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/gender/beck.html (accessed 10/7/2007)

Chase, Cheryl 2003 ‘What is the Agenda of the Intersex Patient Advocacy Movement?’, The Endocrinologist 13.3: 240-242

Coakley, Sarah 2002 Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Philosophy and Gender (Oxford: Blackwell)
Diamond, Milton and H.K. Sigmundson 1997 ‘Sex Reassignment at Birth: Long Term Review and Clinical Implications’, in Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 151: 298-304
Downing, F. Gerald 2005 ‘The Nature(s) of Christian Women and Men’, Theology 58.843: 178-184
Dreger, Alice Domurat 1998 Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of Sex (Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press)

Dreger, Alice Domurat (ed.) 1999 Intersex in the Age of Ethics (Hagerstown, MD: University Publishing Group)

Dreger, Alice Domurat 2004 ‘Intersex Treatment as Standard Medical Practice, or, How Wrong I Was’, online at http://www.isna.org/articles/howwrongiwas (accessed 10/7/2007)

Eiesland, Nancy L. 1994 The Disabled God: Towards a Liberatory Theology of Disability (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press)

Gorringe, T.J. 2001 The Education of Desire: Towards a Theology of the Senses (London: SCM) 

Hampson, Daphne 1990 Theology and Feminism (Oxford: Blackwell)

Hampson, Daphne 1996a 'On Power and Gender', in Thatcher and Stuart 1996: 125-140

Hampson, Daphne (ed.) 1996b Swallowing a Fishbone? Feminist Theologians Debate Christianity (London: SPCK)

Hull, John M. 2001 In the Beginning There Was Darkness: a Blind Person's Conversations with the Bible (London: SCM)

Hull, John M. 2003 ‘A Spirituality of Disability: The Christian Heritage as both Problem and Potential’, Studies in Christian Ethics 16.2: 21-35

Kessler, Suzanne J. 1998 Lessons from the Intersexed (New Brunswick, New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press)

Koyama, Emi 2006 ‘From “Intersex” to “DSD”: Toward a Queer Disability Politics of Gender’, online at http://intersexinitiative.org/articles /intersextodsd.html

Moreno, Angela 1999 ‘In Amerika They Call Us Hermaphrodites’, in Dreger 1999: 137-139

Morland, Iain 2005 ‘Narrating Intersex: On the Ethical Critique of the Medical Management of Intersexuality, 1985-2005’ (PhD thesis, Royal Holloway: University of London)

Morris, Esther 2004 ‘The Self I Will Never Know’, New Internationalist 364: 25-27

O’Donovan, Oliver 1982 Transsexualism and Christian Marriage (Nottingham: Grove Books)

Pailin, David 1992 A Gentle Touch: From a Theology of Handicap to a Theology of Human Being (London: SPCK)

Preves, Sharon E. 2003 Intersex and Identity: The Contested Self (New Brunswick, New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press)

Ruether, Rosemary Radford 1983 Sexism and God-Talk: Towards a Feminist Theology (London: SCM Press)

Thatcher, Adrian and Elizabeth Stuart (eds.) 1996 Christian Perspectives on Sexuality and Gender (Leominster: Gracewing and Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans)

Triea, Kiira 1999 ‘Power, Orgasm and the Psychohormonal Research Unit’, in Dreger 1999: 140-144

Wendell, Susan 1996 The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability (London and New York: Routledge)

Wyschogrod, Edith 1990 Saints and Postmodernism: Revisioning Moral Philosophy (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press)




























^1	  People with intersex conditions were formally known as hermaphrodites, but this term is generally considered to be archaic and misleading, since intersexed people do not have an entire set of male and female genitalia. In the 1950s and 60s, the paradigm of conducting ‘corrective’ genital surgeries in infancy or early childhood came to the fore. Many corrective surgeries for intersex still take place on young children, but may cause unwanted side-effects such as a lack of sexual sensation later on.
^2	  DSD stands for Disorders of Sexual Differentiation (or Development), and is preferred by some to the terminology of intersex. However, ‘DSD’ is still problematic (carrying, as it does, the weight of the language of ‘disorder’, with its implications of pathology), and ‘intersex’ is still the more commonly-used term.
^3	  Most intersex conditions do not actually require genital surgery for any physiological reason; the vast majority of surgeries carried out on atypical genitals, particularly in childhood, are non-essential ones. The psychological problems attached to intersex seem to stem as much, or more so, from corrective surgeries as from the conditions themselves (Alderson, Madill and Balen 2004: 83, Kessler 1998: 97).
^4	  Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome is an intersex condition where an XY foetus, which would usually develop into a male child, cannot respond to testosterone and other androgens in utero. As a result, the external genitalia appear typically female, although the internal organs will be male. AIS children look like typical girls and are almost always reared and identify as girls. They often have their testes removed, and may also undergo surgery to lengthen the vagina, which can be shallow or absent, in order to allow penetrative vaginal intercourse later.
^5	  Wendell notes that it is necessary to remember that there is no objective standard of ‘normality’ to be a benchmark. A fatigue-inducing illness might be far less ‘disabling’ in a western society of cars and escalators than in a society where everyone has to be able to walk very long distances to fetch water. (Thus, says Wendell, it should be ensured that policy-making to improve accessibility for people with disabilities is not always done by wealthy urbanites cushioned by mod-cons.) Disability does not equal illness, and most people with disabilities are not ‘globally incapacitated’ (Wendell 1996: 20) – that is to say, they would not find themselves equally disabled in every society.
